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Abstract 
The investor-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”) system has been 
undergoing significant change along two fronts. First, multi-stakeholder 
efforts, primarily led by States via the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), have recently been 
considering various largely procedural reform options. Second, 
international investment agreements (“IIAs”) have likewise evolved in 
recent years, influenced by, inter alia, new foreign investment priorities 
and drafting approaches. Alongside this twin evolution, stakeholders 
continue to express concerns regarding the effects, both direct and 
indirect, of the ISDS system on human rights. As such, if the ISDS 
system is to better accommodate human rights considerations, States 
must deploy their many tools, such as negotiation and drafting of IIAs, 
in furtherance of such objectives, while concurrently aligning such 
efforts with ongoing discussions around procedural reforms, so as to 
avoid unintended fragmentation and maximize impact. Ultimately, we 
argue that the ISDS system may finally be positioned to bend the arc 
of its trajectory toward a more accommodating system for human 
rights. However, we caution that the focus on human rights remains 
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I. Introduction: A Dawn for ISDS — Towards Reform? 
The investor-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”) system has been 
undergoing significant change along two fronts. First, multi-stakeholder 
efforts, primarily led by States via the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), have recently been 
considering various, largely procedural, reform options. Second, 
international investment agreements (“IIAs”) have likewise evolved in 
recent years, influenced by, inter alia, new foreign investment priorities 
and drafting approaches. Alongside this twin evolution, stakeholders 
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continue to express concerns regarding the effects, both direct and 
indirect, of the ISDS system on human rights.1 In particular, the 
inherent investor-centric bias of the ISDS system has been said to 
negatively impact States’ efforts to satisfy its human rights obligations 
on the international plane.2 
We consider the convergence of the future trajectory of ISDS, 
encompassing both proposed procedural reform options and the recent 
evolution of IIAs, with the longstanding expressed concerns of the 
impact of the ISDS system on human rights. Several foci structure our 
analysis. First, entrenched barriers persist regarding the opportunity 
for a robust role for human rights considerations in the ISDS system. 
Such barriers are both procedural and substantive, suggesting the 
importance of broad reform efforts. Second, even where efforts have 
been made to better accommodate human rights considerations within 
the ISDS system, which human rights have been included remains 
limited. As the scope of human rights norms and obligations expands, 
so too must the ISDS system flex if it is to accommodate. Third, and 
crucially, States continue to play a paramount role in both the 
international human rights architecture and ISDS system. As such, if 
the ISDS system is to better accommodate human rights considerations, 
States must deploy their many tools, such as negotiation and drafting 
of IIAs, in furtherance of such objectives—while concurrently aligning 
such efforts with ongoing discussions around procedural reforms—so as 
to avoid unintended fragmentation and maximize impact. Ultimately, 
we argue that the ISDS system may finally be positioned to bend the 
arc of its trajectory toward a more accommodating system for human 
rights. However, we caution that the focus on human rights remains 
fairly limited—perhaps, at times, even a mere afterthought—suggesting 
slow progress. 
In Section II, we first consider selected entrenched barriers, both 
procedural and substantive, in the ISDS system that have historically 
negatively impacted human rights considerations in the foreign 
investment context, to diagnose the problem motivating reform. 
Correspondingly, in Section III, we articulate the cumulative effects of 
said barriers on States’ regulatory autonomy, which is part and parcel 
to the satisfaction of their human rights obligations on the international 
plane. In Sections IV–VI, we turn to ongoing reform developments, both 
characterizing efforts to date and their potential impact on said 
barriers. In Section IV, we introduce the so-called three “generations” 
of rights framework, to help categorize the impact of each development 
on the full spectrum of human rights. In Section V, we consider the 
 
1. See generally Markus Krajewski, A Nightmare or a Noble Dream? 
Establishing Investor Obligations Through Treaty-Making and Treaty-
Application, 5 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 105 (2020). 
2. Id. at 106. 
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robust, ongoing dialogue around largely procedural reform options, 
which has been primarily guided by UNCITRAL. In Section VI, we 
explore trends in recent IIA development that may impact human 
rights. Finally, in Section VII, we provide concluding thoughts on 
whether reforms effort will meaningfully reduce the historical tensions 
between the ISDS system and human rights.  
II. Entrenched Barriers for Human Rights Claims in 
ISDS 
The ISDS system accords certain rights to businesses or individuals 
qua foreign investors.3 These rights “are not accorded to the investors 
for the sake of human flourishing,” but are instead “instrumental” for 
the exportation of capital.4 At bottom, they are part of the “grand 
bargain” by States via IIAs for purposes of attracting foreign capital.5 
Moreover, these rights are only available to a limited subset of entities, 
owing to the significant costs associated with instituting ISDS 
proceedings.6 In contrast, international human rights law accords rights 
to all individuals qua human beings.7 These rights are universal, not 
selective.8 They are also typically “domesticated,” which is to say that 
they are protected primarily by domestic courts,9 with international 
 
3. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 44 (2d ed. 2012) (“International 
investment law is designed to promote and protect the activities of private 
foreign investors. . . . Investors are either individuals (natural persons) or 
companies (juridical persons).”). 
4. ANNE PETERS, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (Larissa van den Herik & Jean 
D’Aspremont eds., Jonathan Huston trans.) (2016). 
5. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: 
An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 
46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 77 (2005) (describing the grand bargain of IIAs 
as a promise to protect capital in return for the prospect of more capital 
in the future). 
6. PETERS, supra note 4, at 320.  
7. See G.A. Res. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”). 
8. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Each State Party 
to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.”) [hereafter ICCPR]. 
9. PETERS, supra note 4, at 321. 
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adjudicatory bodies playing primarily monitoring, not enforcement, 
roles.10  
Consequently, the ISDS system and international human rights law 
“have evolved along radically divergent paths”11 and “rest on different 
legal sources, contain different legal principles and are applied and 
administered in different institutional settings.”12 Moreover, their 
intersection has been complicated by the ways in which human rights 
can be introduced, both as a sword and shield, for strategic purposes 
by the parties in a dispute.13 Therefore, and perhaps unsurprisingly, 
several entrenched barriers obstruct the role of human rights norms and 
obligations within the ISDS system. Although international human 
rights law does not accord businesses or individuals qua foreign 
investors a privileged (normative) position,14 this section seeks to 
highlight such barriers, so as to understand how the ISDS system in 
toto places downward pressure on States’ ability to satisfy its human 
rights obligations on the international plane.15  
A. Jurisdictional Barriers Have Generally Limited Human Rights 
Claims in ISDS  
Unsuccessful attempts to bring independent claims or 
counterclaims alleging human rights violations underline both the 
importance and complexities of establishing jurisdiction in investment 
disputes. As a reflection of party consent, a tribunal only has 
competence to hear claims that fall within its jurisdiction.16 The scope 
 
10. See generally Clara Sandoval et al., Monitoring, Cajoling and Promoting 
Dialogue: What Role for Supranational Human Rights Bodies in the 
Implementation of Individual Decisions?, 12 J. HUM. RTS. PRACTICE 71 
(2020). 
11. Moshe Hirsch, Investment Trbunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 97, 107 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009). 
12. Krajewski, supra note 1, at 108. 
13. Hirsch, supra note 11, at 107. 
14. Id. at 108.  
15. See infra text accompanying notes 107–112. 
16. See ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 132 (2014) (“The jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited to 
the specific category of dispute that the parties have accepted for 
submission to the court or tribunal.”); Clara Reiner & Christoph 
Schreuer, Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 82, 83 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (“[A]rbitral 
tribunals draw their jurisdiction to make binding rulings on a dispute 
solely from the consent of the parties. The tribunal’s jurisdiction is 
consequently both based on and limited to that agreement.”). 
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of the dispute resolution clause in both the IIA and the relevant 
arbitration rules is, therefore, crucial for determining which claims the 
tribunal may hear.17 How a tribunal undertakes to interpret its own 
jurisdiction has been crucial for determining the role of human rights 
in investment disputes.18 
1. Rejecting Human Rights Claims Because They Are “Independent” 
Claims  
To the extent that a human rights issue affects a protected 
investment under the IIA, it may become arbitrable by virtue of its 
relationship to or impact on the investment.19 Moreover, it has been 
argued that, in principle, a broad dispute resolution clause could 
provide for adjudicating a “pure human rights claim.”20 Nonetheless, 
the case law supports the general trend that human rights claims do 
not have autonomous standing as independent claims before ISDS 
tribunals.21 As such, the independent significance of the dispute 
resolution clause has been limited.22 Biloune is the prototypical example 
of this trend, where the tribunal expressed its reluctance to consider an 
independent claim for an alleged human rights violation.23 While the 
tribunal described the dispute resolution clause as “broad,”24 it 
underscored its limited competence vis-à-vis the independent claim,25 
 
17. See Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 16, at 84–85. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See Vivian Kube & E.U. Petersmann, Human Rights in International 
Investment Arbitration, 11 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
65, 73 (2016) (“[I]f the jurisdictional and applicable law clauses of the 
respective IIA are sufficiently broad to include human rights violations, 
adjudicating a pure human rights claim could be possible.”). 
21. Yannick Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
A Perspective from Within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107, 1123 (2012).  
22. Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and 
International Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF CHISTOPOH SCHREUER 678, 679 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 
2009). 
23. See Biloune v. Ghana Inv. Ctr., Ad Hoc Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, 95 I.L.R. 187 (UNCITRAL Trib. Oct. 27, 1989). 
24. See id. at 202 (“The arbitration clause contained at Article 15 of the GIC 
Agreement is broad, providing for arbitration of ‘[a]ny dispute between 
the foreign investor and the Government in respect of an approved 
enterprise’.”).  
25. See id. at 203. Although the tribunal acknowledged the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment that States must 
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not least because the wording “in respect of an approved enterprise” in 
said clause did not envision the parties’ consent to independent claims.26  
In contrast, though with a similar outcome, the tribunal in Chevron 
construed the dispute resolution clause broadly such that it had the 
jurisdiction to entertain a denial of justice claim relating to the 
concession contracts underlying the dispute.27 The claimants sought to 
have the tribunal rely on customary international law in support of its 
denial of justice claim, and cited to both human rights instruments28 
and jurisprudence29 in this regard. The tribunal, however, held that the 
provisions in the IIA regarding denial of justice were lex specialis, which 
precluded the need to refer to customary international law.30 It did not 
discuss the human rights references in its interpretation of the relevant 
provision in the IIA, thereby leaving doubt as to whether, absent a lex 
specialis, the claimants could have sustained its independent claim.31  
Similarly, in Toto, the tribunal again weighed a denial of justice 
claim.32 In this case, however, the tribunal discussed several human 
rights instruments relating to denial of justice.33 Ultimately, it denied 
jurisdiction over the claim because of insufficient evidence.34 While 
some argue that the tribunal seemed open to considering human rights 
 
accord foreign nationals within their territories, it held that “it does not 
follow that this Tribunal is competent to pass upon every type of 
departure from the minimum standard to which foreign nationals are 
entitled, or that this Tribunal is authorized to deal with allegations of 
violations of fundamental human rights.” Id. 
26. Id. at 188 (emphasis added). 
27. See Chevron Corp. (U.S.A.) v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, 
Interim Award, ¶ 209 (UNCITRAL Trib. Dec. 1, 2008) (“Its language 
includes all disputes ‘arising out of or relating to’ investment agreements 
and this language is broad enough to allow the Tribunal to hear a denial 
of justice claim relating to the Concession Agreements.”). 
28. See Chevron Corp. (U.S.A.) v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, 
Partial Award on the Merits, ¶ 166 (UNCITRAL Trib. Mar. 30, 2010) 
(referencing the American Convention on Human Rights). 
29. See id. ¶ 170 (referencing the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights). 
30. Chevron Corp. (U.S.A.) v. Republic of Ecuador, ¶¶ 242–45 (UNCITRAL 
Trib. Dec. 1, 2008).  
31. Cf. Kube & Petersmann, supra note 20, at 74–75 (“Hence, it is impossible 
to trace the precise impact of the human rights argumentation of the 
investor on the arbitral award.”). 
32. Toto Construzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 157–60 (Sept. 11, 2009). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. ¶ 168. 
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as independent claims,35 some caution is warranted. In particular, the 
tribunal appeared to be referencing several external sources, including 
human rights instruments, simply for purposes of clarifying its 
statement that “[i]t has to be conceded that international law has no 
strict standards to assess whether court delays are a denial of justice,”36 
cautioning against extrapolating broader significance. 
2. Rejecting Human Rights Counterclaims Because of a Narrow Reading 
of the Requirements for Counterclaims 
The scope of the dispute resolution clause is likewise relevant for 
determining jurisdiction over counterclaims.37 For States, where the 
applicable IIA provides for sufficient investor responsibilities, 
counterclaims can be a potential basis to allege human rights violations 
by investors.38 The ICSID Arbitration Rules,39 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules,40 and SCC Arbitration Rules41 each provide for the possibility 
that a tribunal may entertain a counterclaim. In determining its 
jurisdiction over a counterclaim, a tribunal will typically consider two 
factors, namely, whether the parties had consented to the possibility of 
counterclaims and whether the counterclaim is sufficiently related to 
the underlying claim in the dispute.42 In practice, tribunals have largely 
not permitted counterclaims for several reasons.  
First, regarding whether the parties had consented to the possibility 
of counterclaims, explicit consent is typically not present.43 Two notable 
 
35. See Kube & Petersmann, supra note 20, at 75 (arguing that the tribunal 
“appeared to be in principle open towards considering human rights as 
independent claims”); Freya Baetens, Invoking Human Rights: A Useful 
Line of Attack or a Defence Tool for States in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement?, in HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN ‘OTHER’ INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS 227, 232 (Martin Scheinin ed., 2019) (“Not only did it show 
willingness to accept the applicability of human rights law; it also seemed 
open to considering independent human rights assertions on the merits.”). 
36. Toto Construzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 155 (Sept. 11, 2009). 
37. See generally Barnali Choudhury, Investor Obligations for Human Rights, 
35 ICSID REV. (forthcoming). 
38. Id. 
39. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 46, Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereafter Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes]. 
40. G.A. Res. 68/109 (2013).  
41. ARBITRATION INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHANGER OF COM., 
ARBITRATION RULES art. 9(1)(iii) (2017). 
42. See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 37. 
43. See id. 
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exceptions concern the interconnected cases of Burlington44 and 
Perenco,45 where, in both cases, the parties had consented to the 
counterclaims. Where consent is not explicitly present, however, a 
tribunal will look to the wording of the dispute resolution clause.46 If 
the wording is sufficiently broad, a tribunal may choose to entertain 
the counterclaim.47 In Aven, the tribunal found that the dispute 
settlement clause was “in principle wide enough” to envisage 
counterclaims and, in particular, not exclusively claims brought by an 
investor.48 Similarly, in Urbaser, the tribunal construed the dispute 
resolution clause broadly such that it provided for the “possibility” of 
a host State, not just an investor, submitting a claim.49 
In contrast, several tribunals have denied jurisdiction over 
counterclaims based on either narrowly construing the dispute 
resolution clause to only permit claims brought by investors, not host 
States, or a lack of consent by the investor.50 In Spyridon Roussalis, the 
tribunal denied jurisdiction over a counterclaim because the dispute 
resolution clause “undoubtedly” limited its jurisdiction only to claims 
brought by investors, not host States.51 Similarly, in Rusoro Mining, 
the tribunal denied jurisdiction over a counterclaim because the IIA 
“does not leave room for doubt: [it] affords investors, and only investors, 
 
44. Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on Counterclaims, ¶ 60 (Feb. 7, 2017). 
45. Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/6, Decision on Perenco’s Application for Dismissal of Ecuador’s 
Counterclaims, ¶ 44 (Aug. 18, 2017). 
46. Choudhury, supra note 37, at 14. 
47. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing 
Investment Law, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 461, 474 (2013) (“Ab initio, 
the tribunal’s decision with respect to counterclaims hinges on the 
authority given it by the treaty and by an investor’s consent to arbitrate 
according to the terms of the treaty.”). 
48. Aven v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award of 
Tribunal, ¶ 740 (Sept. 18, 2018). 
49. Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 
¶ 1153 (Dec. 8, 2016). 
50. See, e.g., id.  
51. Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 
869 (Dec. 7, 2011); but see Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/1, Declaration of W. Michael Reisman (Dec. 7, 2011) (“I 
understand the line of their analysis but, in my view, when the States 
Parties to a BIT contingently consent, inter alia, to ICSID jurisdiction, 
the consent component of Article 46 of the Washington Convention is 
ipso facto imported into any ICSID arbitration which an investor then 
elects to pursue.”). 
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standing to file arbitrations against host States . . . .”52 In Vestey, the 
tribunal denied jurisdiction over a counterclaim because of a lack of 
consent, owing to an insufficient connection between Venezuela’s 
obligations under the IIA and the subject matter of the counterclaim.53 
Moreover, in Gavazzi, the tribunal (by majority) denied jurisdiction 
over a counterclaim, holding that “[w]here there is no jurisdiction 
provided by the wording of the BIT in relation to a counterclaim, no 
jurisdiction can be inferred merely from the ‘spirit’ of the BIT.”54 
Second, regarding whether the counterclaim is sufficiently related 
to the underlying claim in the dispute, the case law is varied. In 
Urbaser, the tribunal found a “factual link” between the two claims 
because they were both based on the same investment vis-à-vis the 
same IIA.55 Similarly, in Goetz, the tribunal granted jurisdiction over a 
counterclaim because its subject matter, regarding damages, flowed 
from the underlying breach at issue in the primary claim.56 In contrast, 
in Saluka, while the tribunal acknowledged the difficulty in determining 
a universal approach to establishing the appropriate degree of 
connectedness between a counterclaim and underlying claim,57 it denied 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim because the legal basis was found in 
Czech law, not the IIA.58 Similarly, in Paushok, the tribunal denied 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim due to a lack of connectedness with 
 
52. Rusoro Mining Ltd. V. Bolivarian Rebublic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, ¶ 627 (Aug. 22, 2016).   
53. Vestey Group Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/4, Award, ¶ 333 (Apr. 15, 2016). 
54. Gavazzi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Liability, ¶ 154 (Apr. 21, 2015); see also 
Tomoko Ishikawa, Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v Romania: A 
New Approach to Determining Jurisdiction over Counterclaims in ICSID 
Arbitration?, 32 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 721, 725 (2017) (“IIA-
based ICSID arbitration tribunals have consistently determined the 
presence and absence of consent to jurisdiction over counterclaims by 
scrutinizing the language of the dispute resolution clause, without 
requiring an explicit authorization of counterclaims in the relevant IIA. 
The emphasis placed by the . . . majority decision on the omission of 
reference to counterclaims in the BIT is a departure from consistent case 
law.”). 
55. Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 
¶ 1151 (Dec. 8, 2016). 
56. Goetz v. Republique du Burundi, Affaire CIRDI No. ARB/01/2, 
Sentence, ¶ 285 (June 21, 2012). 
57. See Saluka Invs. BV (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 
63 (PCA 2006) (“No single attempt to define this requirement with 
universal effect is likely to be satisfactory”). 
58. Id. ¶ 79. 
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the underlying claim and seemed to imply that matters concerning 
domestic law can never satisfy the connectedness requirement.59 
B. Tribunals’ Interpretations of the Scope of the Applicable Law Has 
Resulted in Inconsistent Practice  
Even where the scope of the dispute resolution clause may not 
permit a tribunal to entertain an independent claim or counterclaim, a 
tribunal may, nonetheless, consider human rights by way of the 
applicable law.60 Indeed, which specific human rights might apply is 
determined by the substantive standards of the applicable law.61 If an 
IIA specifies the applicable law, it is typically both domestic law and 
international law.62 If, however, an IIA is silent as to the applicable law, 
it will be determined by the applicable rules of procedure.63 Where a 
tribunal has recourse to international law, it may introduce 
international human rights norms, obligations, or instruments.64 
However, at least three barriers may persist regarding a robust role for 
human rights qua applicable law.  
First, the law does not obligate a tribunal to consider human rights, 
even where the applicable law encompasses international law.65 Indeed, 
it may decide not to because it does not view human rights as directly 
 
59. Paushok v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 693 
(UNCITRAL Apr. 28, 2011) (“In considering whether the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction to consider the counterclaims, it must therefore decide 
whether there is a close connection between them and the primary claim 
from which they arose or whether the counterclaims are matters that are 
otherwise covered by the general law of Respondent.”). 
60. Cf. DE BRABANDERE, supra note 16, at 134 (“[T]here is no reason for the 
tribunal to exclude ipso facto human rights considerations as a matter of 
applicable law.”). 
61. See Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 16, at 84 (“[I]t does not suffice to 
establish the tribunal’s jurisdiction over alleged violations of human 
rights, since the analysis and evaluation of the breaches will depend upon 
the applicable substantive standards.”). 
62. NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND 
HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2015); see also Reiner & 
Schreuer, supra note 16, at 84 (describing such clauses as “composite 
choice of law clauses”). 
63. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, supra note 39, art. 42(1) (providing that, failing an agreement 
between the parties as to the applicable law, the tribunal must apply the 
domestic law of the host State and “such rules of international law as may 
be applicable”); see also ICSID Convention, Regulations and 
Rules, art. 42, Apr. 2006 (clarifying that “international law” in Article 
42(1) has been interpreted as reflective of Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute). 
64. DE BRABANDERE, supra note 16, at 134–36. 
65. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 39.  
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impacting the core issues of the dispute. For example, in CMS, 
Argentina argued that “as the economic and social crisis that affected 
the country compromised basic human rights, no investment treaty 
could prevail as it would be in violation of such constitutionally 
recognized rights.”66 The tribunal disagreed with this attempt to 
privilege human rights vis-à-vis the IIA, finding that “there is no 
question of affecting fundamental human rights” in the case.67 
Second, if a tribunal decides to consider human rights, which 
specific human rights norms, obligations, or instruments it introduces 
are at its discretion.68 Moreover, the scope of certain human rights, 
particularly second and third-generation human rights, may not be 
precise, thus creating confusion on the obligations of States regarding 
those rights.69 Urbaser aptly illustrates this flexibility. In that case, the 
tribunal observed that the IIA was not “a closed system strictly 
preserving investors’ rights,”70 but a part of international law, thereby 
including human rights.71 It then discussed an array of human rights 
instruments, including several nonbinding instruments, seeming to treat 
each as having equal dispositive weight.72 It further expressed its 
“reluctan[ce]” to accept that guaranteeing the right to water must be 
exclusively a State obligation73 and stated, rather controversially and 
absent substantiation, that “international law accepts corporate social 
responsibility.”74  
 
66. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 114 (May 12, 2005). 
67. Id. ¶ 121. 
68. See Monica Feria-Tinta, Like Oil and Water? Human Rights in 
Investment Arbitration in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Uruguay, 34 J. 
INT’L ARB. 601, 628 (2017) (discussing how human rights and 
international investment law have a ‘tense’ relationship). 
69. See infra text accompanying notes 111–120 (discussing second and third 
generation human rights). 
70. Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 
¶ 1191 (Dec. 8, 2016). 
71. Id. ¶ 1192. 
72. Id.¶¶ 1196–8. 
73. Id. ¶ 1193; see Krajewski, supra note 1, at 124 (“Yet, if there is a human 
right obligation to provide water to the citizens and if the investor is 
bound by human rights it is not convincing that the investor would not 
be bound by such an obligation as well.”). 
74. Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 2016 ICSID 
¶ 1195; see Krajewski, supra note 1, at 124–5 (“The tribunal not only 
erroneously held that Article 30 of the UDHR and Article 5 of the 
ICCPR contain a legal basis of human rights obligations of individuals 
and companies . . . [T]he tribunal’s reasoning does not reflect the 
current state of human rights law.”). 
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Third, even supposing that a tribunal introduces human rights 
norms, the role that such norms play in the decision may vary. In 
Urbaser, human rights considerations discussed by the tribunal had a 
dispositive impact on the merits of the counterclaim,75 although not in 
a manner that supported human rights as such. In Suez–InterAgua, 
Argentina argued that its obligations regarding the right to water 
superseded its obligations under the IIA and the presence of such a 
right enabled it to take actions contrary to its obligations under the 
BIT.76 The tribunal concluded that it could “not find a basis for such 
a conclusion either in the BITs or international law,” and held that 
Argentina was subject to the obligations arising under both human 
rights and the IIAs.77 Hence, and as quintessentially representative of 
the attendant challenges for States, “Argentina’s human rights 
obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, 
contradictory, or mutually exclusive.”78  
C. Continued Scarcity of Investor Responsibilities in IIAs  
Currently, investors do not have direct obligations regarding 
human rights on the international plane.79 It has, however, been said 
that businesses have a “social license to operate.”80 Indeed, the Human 
Rights Council has underscored “imbalances” between businesses and 
States, which may negatively impact human rights, as a result of the 
proliferation of IIAs and their role in the ISDS system.81 In particular, 
given the expansion of nonbinding global norms regarding responsible 
business conduct, it has been argued that “IIAs are seemingly now at 
odds with contemporary practice defining business responsibility.”82 
While efforts continue to establish binding human rights obligations for 
corporations on the international plane,83 provisions in IIAs establishing 
investor responsibilities remain relatively permissive.84 Selected 
 
75. See Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 2016 ICSID ¶¶ 1206–10. 
76. Suez-InterAgua v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, ¶ 240 (July 30, 2010). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. PETERS, supra note 4, at 101. 
80. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, 
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right 
to Development, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, ¶ 54 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
81. Id. ¶ 12. 
82. Choudhury, supra note 37, at 2. 
83. See, e.g., id. 
84. Jesse Coleman et al., International Investment Agreements 2018: A 
Review of Trends and New Approaches, YEARBOOK ON INT’L. 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Adding New Ingredients to an Old Recipe: Do ISDS Reforms and New 
Investment Treaties Support Human Rights? 
130 
 
categorical examples are discussed here, to illustrate their impact, while 
Section VI provides an exhaustive analysis of recent trends. 
First, IIAs may contain operative provisions requiring that 
investors comply with the laws of the host State, typically only during 
the establishment phase of the investment.85 For example, the 
Argentina–UAE BIT broadly requires that “the investors and 
investments of each Party shall comply with the laws, regulations, and 
policies of the host Party with respect to the management, operation, 
and disposition of investments.”86 Noncompliance with domestic laws, 
in this instance, “will have an international legal effect.”87 Tribunals 
have relied on such provisions to deny jurisdiction over an investor’s 
claim.88 Other tribunals have applied proportionality to their analyses 
 
INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 2018, §7, §7.73–4 (2018); see also Jean Ho, The 
Creation of Elusive Investor Responsibility, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 
UNBOUND 10, 13 (2019) (“When corporate investors, whether motivated 
by profit or civic duty, voluntarily adopt sustainable and lawful business 
practices, the pursuit of investor responsibility in international fora 
becomes redundant.”). 
85. See Matthew C. Bate, Stephen Khon & Cynthia Liu, Investment 




86. Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
Arg.-U.A.E., art. 14(a), Apr. 16, 2018. 
87. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 394 (Aug. 16, 2007). 
88. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 
¶ 118 (Dec. 23, 2010); Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El 
Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 335 (Aug. 2, 2006); 
Alasdair Ross Anderson v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, ¶ 59 (May 19, 2010). 
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of such provisions to both grant89 and deny90 jurisdiction. In particular, 
to the extent that domestic laws include human rights-related 
obligations for businesses vis-à-vis foreign investments, they may be a 
jurisdictional bar to investor’s claims.  
Second, IIAs may contain operative provisions seeking to combat 
corruption, which can be directed to either the parties or investors.91 
For example, the Brazil–Ethiopia BIT provides that the parties “shall 
adopt measures and make efforts to prevent and fight corruption, 
money laundering and terrorism financing” regarding matters within 
the scope of the agreement.92 For another example, the Belarus–India 
BIT provides that investors “shall not, either prior to or after the 
establishment of an investment, offer, promise, or give any undue 
pecuniary advantage, gratification or gift whatsoever, whether directly 
or indirectly, to a public servant or official of a Party as an inducement 
or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or obtain or 
maintain other improper advantage nor shall be complicit in inciting, 
aiding, abetting, or conspiring to commit such acts.”93 Notably, breach 
of this provision precludes investors from initiating arbitrations under 
the agreement.94 While some tribunals have relied on the presence of 
corruption to deny jurisdiction,95 other tribunals have carefully parsed 
 
89. See, e.g., Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe S.A. v. 
Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, ¶ 483 (Mar. 
30, 2015) (“The Tribunal agrees with the view that not every trivial, 
minor contravention of the law should lead to a refusal of jurisdiction. It 
must strike a balance between two criteria.”); Vladislav Kim v. Republic 
of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 
413 (Mar. 8, 2017) (“In the Tribunal’s view, the interpretive task is guided 
by the principle of proportionality. The Tribunal must balance the object 
of promoting economic relations by providing a stable investment 
framework with the harsh consequence of denying the application of the 
BIT in total when the investment is not made in compliance with 
legislation.”). 
90. E.g., Cortec Mining Kenya Ltd., Cortec (Pty) Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/15/29, Award of the Tribunal, ¶¶ 319–21 (Oct. 22, 
2018). 
91. See Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on Investment Cooperation and 
Facilitation, Brazil-Eth., art. 15(1), Apr. 11, 2018. 
92. Id. 
93. Treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of India on 
Investments, Belr.-India, art. 11(ii), Sept. 24, 2018. 
94. Id. at art. 13.3. 
95. See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006) (“[T]his Tribunal is convinced 
that bribery is contrary to the international public policy of most, if not 
all, States or, to use another formula, to transnational public policy. Thus, 
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the relationship between the corrupt acts and the investment to decline 
to deny jurisdiction.96 Moreover, the presence of corruption itself 
requires complicity on the part of the host State,97 belying complex 
dynamics for a tribunal to sort. 
Third, IIAs may contain operative provisions regarding corporate 
social responsibility (“CSR”), although the practical effect of such 
provisions remains unknown and likely minimal,98 due to the drafting 
of the provisions. CSR provisions often employ broad, open-textured 
language.99 They are also often couched in nonbinding terms requiring, 
for example, that investors “strive” or “endeavor” to achieve certain 
human rights objectives.100 In many instances, they are directed to 
 
claims based on contracts of corruption or on contracts obtained by 
corruption cannot be upheld by this Arbitral Tribunal.”); Metal-Tech 
Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 
290 (Oct. 4, 2013).  
96. E.g., Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd. v. People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 454 
(Aug. 19, 2013) (holding that, because “the [joint venture agreement] had 
been concluded long before the acts of corruption”, the tribunal retained 
jurisdiction). 
97. See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 180 (Oct. 4, 2006) (“[O]n the evidence before this 
Tribunal, the bribe was apparently solicited by the Kenyan President and 
not wholly initiated by the Claimant.”). 
98. But see David Gaukrodger, Consultation Paper by the OECD Secretariat, 
Business Responsibilities and Investment Treaties ¶¶ 401–04 (Jan. 15, 
2020) (highlighting the purposes of such provisions, such as: leveling the 
playing field between products produced in host versus home States under 
different regulatory regimes regarding responsible business conduct; 
potentially overcoming objections to the extraterritorial reach of activities 
in the host State; and providing a foundation for applying doctrines like 
“clean hands” for purposes of both bringing a claim or recovery). 
99. E.g., Agreement between the Argentine Republic and Japan for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Japan, art. 17, Dec. 1, 2018 
(providing that the parties reaffirm the importance of encouraging 
investors to voluntarily incorporate “internationally recognised standards, 
guidelines and principles of corporate social responsibility that have been 
endorsed or are supported by” the party in whose jurisdiction the investor 
operates). 
100. E.g., Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement between the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Arab Emirates, Brazil-
U.A.E., art. 15(1), Mar. 15, 2019 (“Investors and their investment shall 
strive to achieve the highest possible level of contribution to the 
sustainable development of the Host State and the local community, 
through the adoption of a high degree of socially responsible practices, 
based on the voluntary principles, and standards set out in the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.”). 
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States, rather than investors.101 The Morocco-Nigeria BIT is a notable 
exception in this regard, requiring that investors “uphold” human rights 
in the host State,102 although the use of “uphold,” rather than “respect, 
protect, and fulfill” creates some confusion.103 Other IIAs contain 
related, but more permissive provisions.104 Finally, the consequences for 
breach of binding or nonbinding CSR provisions can be unclear, thereby 
reducing their practical effects.105  
The diagram below illustrates the different typologies when it 
comes to investor responsibilities: 
 
 
101. Id. at art. 15(2). 
102. Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, art. 18(2), Dec. 3, 2016. 
103. Krajewski, supra note 1, at 115. 
104. E.g., Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement between the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Malawi, Brazil-Malawi, 
art. 9(1), June 25, 2015 (“Investors and their investment shall strive to 
achieve the highest possible level of contribution to the sustainable 
development of the Host Party and the local community, through the 
adoption of a high degree of socially responsible practices, based on the 
voluntary principles and standards set out in this Article.”). 
105. Coleman et al., supra note 84, ¶ 7.79. 
Investor 
Responsibilities
Provisions to comply 
with host State laws
Limited to the 
Establishment Phase
Provisions to combat 
corruption






Often directed at 
States and not at 
investors
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III. Potential Impact of ISDS Claims on a State’s 
Regulatory Autonomy Resulting in a Regulatory 
Chill 
Regulatory autonomy has been referred to as “the legal right 
exceptionally permitting the host state to regulate in derogation of 
international commitments it has undertaken by means of an 
investment agreement without incurring a duty to compensate.”106 
States exercise their regulatory autonomy to enact domestic measures 
that provide for satisfaction of their direct obligations regarding human 
rights.107 Such obligations can exist regionally or internationally.108 
While States only consent to the regional or international human rights 
instruments to which they wish to be party, their direct obligations 
regarding human rights on the international plane likewise originate in 
customary international law.109 Moreover, States have the primary 
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of all 
individuals within their jurisdiction in the context of corporate 
 
106. AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 33 (2014). 
107. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 41–43 (discussing the importance of “horizontal 
enforcement” in human rights law). 
108. See generally Başak Çalı, Regional Protection, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 411, 411–424 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2018) 
(discussing the historical relationship between regional and international 
human rights obligations and instruments). 
109. See Henkin, supra note 107, at 35–41 (arguing that “[i]nternational human 
rights law is a revolutionary penetration of the once impermeable state” 
and describing the emergence of customary international law obligations 
regarding human rights). 
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activities,110 including specifically with regard to obligations arising 
under the ICCPR111 and ICESCR.112  
The effect of the ISDS system on States’ efforts to satisfy its 
obligations on the international legal plane, whether directly relating to 
human rights or otherwise, has been described as “chilling.”113 Broadly, 
so-called regulatory chill refers to the fact that “[i]n some 
circumstances, governments will respond to a high (perceived) threat 
of investment arbitration by failing to enact or enforce bona fide 
regulatory measures (or by modifying measures to such an extent that 
their original intent is undermined or their effectiveness is severely 
diminished).”114 Indeed, as South Africa described during the WGIII 
discussions regarding ISDS reform: 
 
110. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rts., Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, at I(A)(1) (2011) 
(“States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This 
requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and 
redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and 
adjudication.”).  
111. See ICCPR, supra note 8 at art. 2(1); see also Office of the High Comm’r 
for Human Rts., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 1326 May 2004, ¶ 8 (adopted Mar. 29, 2004) 
(“[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights 
will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not 
just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against 
acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application 
between private persons or entities.”). 
112. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 
2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.”). 
113. See, e.g., Krajewski, supra note 1, at 112; Choudhury, supra note 38, at 
6; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 70, 77; Suzanne A. Spears, Making 
Way for the Public Interest in International Investment Agreements, in 
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 271–72 
(Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011); Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory 
Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in 
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606-10 
(Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011). 
114. Tienhaara, supra note 113, at 610. 
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Often, investors use ISDS strategically, publicly and repeatedly 
filing cases to coerce governments to agree on favourable terms 
for their investments, rather than turning to ISDS as a measure 
of last resort. Even though IIAs do not in themselves directly 
limit the legislative or regulatory powers of States, they may lead 
governments to thread more cautiously—and hence potentially 
insufficiently from a public-interest perspective—when planning 
and designing regulation. As such, governments might refrain 
from imposing regulatory measures in the public interest due to 
the threat of investment arbitration and the high damages it 
entails.115  
Recent cases in investment treaty arbitration have shown that 
international regulation of foreign investment can touch upon sensitive 
areas of public concern, such as environmental regulation,116 a 
regulation protecting the public health,117 measures relating to energy 
policies,118 measures taken to protect indigenous cultures and cultural 
heritage,119 urban policy,120 and taxation.121  
The current backlash towards the ISDS partly stems from the fact 
that the treaty terms are indeterminate and, therefore, the degree of 
delegation to decentralized arbitral tribunals has resulted in broad 
interpretations that were often not envisioned by State parties.122 This 
 
115. UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS): Submission from the Government of South Africa, ¶ 63, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176 (July 17, 2019). 
116. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., UNCITRAL Case, Final Award on Jurisdiction 
and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005); Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL Case, 
Award (Aug. 2, 2010). 
117. Philip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/07, Award (July 8, 2016). 
118. Charanne B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Com. Case No. 062/2012, Final Award (Jan. 21, 2016).  
119. Glamis Gold Ltd v. U.S., UNCITRAL Case, Award (June 8, 2009) 
120. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Award (May 25, 2004). 
121. Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Co. v. The Government of Mongolia, 
UNCITRAL Case, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Apr. 28, 2011); 
Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/5, Decision on LIability (Dec. 14, 2012). 
122. Andreas Kulick & Eberhard Karls, Reassertion of Control: An 
Introduction, in REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INV. TREATY 
REGIME 25 (Andreas Kulick & Eberhard Karls eds., 2016) (“A high level 
of control lies undoubtedly with the Contracting Parties with regard to 
treaty drafting, amendment and termination. However, as long as a 
tribunal may interpret the IIA, drafting and amendment are no warranty 
that the tribunal follows exactly what the Contracting Parties had in 
mind”). 
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results in an asymmetric system that is allegedly skewed towards the 
investor with constant sidelining of regulatory powers of the State and 
human rights concerns raised by them.123 The challenge for States 
becomes ensuring satisfaction of their direct human rights obligations, 
including vis-à-vis businesses, within the constraints of the ISDS 
system, which can be especially difficult in emergency situations, such 
as a financial crisis requiring rapid and decisive regulatory actions in 
service of human rights.124 One obvious remedy that States have 
adopted to that end has involved redrafting treaties to provide more 
clarity and potentially insert institutional and procedural mechanisms 
that control or limit the exercise of delegated interpretation.125  
IV. Creating a Human Rights Typology to Evaluate 
the ISDS Reform Process: The Three “Generational” 
of Human Rights  
Before delving into the thematic characteristics of the reform 
proposals, it is pertinent to chart out the conceptualization of human 
rights for the purposes of this paper. We seek to utilize the framework 
developed by Karel Vašák: a threefold taxonomy for classifying human 
rights.126 While we do not seek to delve into the merits of the taxonomy, 
we lay a broad outline for the purposes of this paper as it acts as a 
prism through which the unique nature of ISDS vis-à-vis human rights 
 
123. Lorenzo Cotula & Brooke Güven, Investor-State Arbitration: An 
Opportunity for Real Reform?, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT: BLOG (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.iied.org/investor-state-arbitration-opportunity-for-real-
reform [https://perma.cc/WK9F-X9M8]. 
124. See Choudhury, supra note 37, at 6 (“Yet when States are confronted 
with new situations—such as in a financial crisis or upon becoming aware 
of a new health peril—it may need to enact new regulations that can 
impede investors’ rights. In these instances, States must choose whether 
to regulate to protect human rights or interfere with investors’ rights and 
risk an adverse, and often costly, arbitral award.”). 
125. Eleni Methymaki & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Masters of Puppets? 
Reassertion of Control through Joint Investment Treaty Interpretation, 
in REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 
161–62 (Andreas Kulick & Eberhard Karls eds., 2016) (“However, 
interpretation by the parties remains as an important safeguard so that 
they will not end up being bound by obligations they did not really (mean 
to) assume”). 
126. Karel Vašák, Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: The Sustained 
Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 30 UNESCO COURIER 29–32 (1977); see also Sumner B. Twiss, 
Moral Grounds and Plural Cultures: Interpreting Human Rights in the 
International Community, 26 J. RELIG. ETHICS 271, 272 (1998) for a 
description of a similar taxonomy of human rights. 
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may be seen. The three generations of rights elucidated above are 
described below in greater clarity to establish a working framework of 
the three generations of rights. 
According to Vašák, first-generation rights encompass negative 
rights and correspond to civil and political rights.127 Civil-political 
human rights primarily include two categories: rights relating to 
physical security (e.g., prohibition against torture, slavery, arbitrary 
arrest) and rights relating to civil liberties (e.g., fair trial, right to 
property, due process, judicial efficiency etc.).128 Such rights find their 
genesis in legal documents such as the Magna Carta129 and the United 
States Bill of Rights.130 In their modern form, they are enshrined in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights131 and may 
primarily be viewed in a “negative sense.”132 This prohibits the State 
from undertaking acts that may be detrimental to the civil and political 
liberties of its citizens (“First-Generation Rights”).  
Second-generation rights reflect a positive action on behalf of the 
State to include economic, social, and cultural rights.133 Similarly, socio-
economic rights are bifurcated into two categories: rights relating to 
social needs (e.g., water, nutrition, health care etc.) and rights relating 
to economic needs (e.g., fair wage, healthcare insurance, etc.).134 In 
contrast to First-Generation Rights, rights under this category place an 
obligation on the State to undertake positive acts to bolster the social, 
economic and cultural status of its citizens.135 The prominent 
international legal instrument for such rights is the International 
 
127. Vašák, supra note 126, at 29. 
128. David Pupovac, Spasimir Domaradzki, & Margaryta Khvostova, Karel 
Vasak’s Generations of Rights and the Contemporary Human Rights 
Discourse, 20 HUM. RTS. REV. 423, 437 (2019) (“The dominant bigrams 
in the first generation of rights are ‘civil society,’ ‘war crimes,’ ‘human 
dignity,’ ‘death penalty,’ ‘crimes (against) humanity,’ ‘property rights,’ 
‘freedom of association,’ and ‘religious freedom.’). 
129. Magna Carta, 1215, (Eng.). 
130. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. 
131. ICCPR, supra note 8. 




134. Lindsey Reid, The Generations of Human Rights, UAB INST. FOR HUM. 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Second 
Generation Rights”).136  
Finally, third-generation rights encompass so-called collective 
rights, such as the right to a healthy environment and right to 
participation in cultural heritage.137 Rights of such nature focus on the 
collective action of society as a whole and include within its ambit, 
inter alia, the rights to self-determination, and preservation of a healthy 
environment.138 By placing their emphasis on collective action of States 
and individuals, such rights may be found in international instruments 
such as the Stockholm Declaration,139 Declaration on the Right to 
Development,140 and United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People141 (“Third-Generation Rights”). 
Traditionally, the ISDS regime has recognized certain civil and 
political rights, perhaps most notably the right to property, but also 
access to justice and due process.142 As such, it has primarily focused 
on these certain First-Generation Rights. In contrast, Second-
Generation Rights have received only modest attention within the ISDS 
regime. Notably, Second- and Third-Generation Rights have recently 
been discussed in the context of evolving operative provisions in IIAs143 
and drafting new model investment agreements.144 However, on the 
 
136. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966). 
137. Spasimir Domaradzki,Margaryta Khvostova & David Pupovac, Karel 
Vasak’s Generations of Rights and the Contemporary Human Rights 
Discourse, 20 HUM. RTS. REV. 423 (Sept. 6, 2019).  
138. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the 
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 5–16, 1972). 
139. See id.  
140. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992). 
141. See G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Mar. 2008). 
142. Kabir A.N. Duggal, ISDS Reform and Advancing All “Generations” of 




143. See generally Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to 
Incorporating Human Rights Issues into International Investment 
Agreements, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 670 (2011). 
144. See generally Kabir A.N. Duggal & Laurens H. van de Ven, The 2019 
Netherlands Model BIT: Riding the New Investment Treaty Waves, 35 
ARB. INT’L 347 (2019).  
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whole, Second- and Third-Generation Rights have not factored 
prominently in ISDS.  
V. Key Reform Proposals for the Future of ISDS  
With this framework in mind, we delve into the substance of key 
reform proposals. We first focus on the UN negotiations to reform ISDS 
conducted under the aegis of the UNCITRAL Working Group III 
(“Working Group III”).145 Consequently, we delve into a major 
European proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court (“Multilateral 
Investment Court”). Finally, at an institutional level we analyze the 
proposal for amendment to the ICSID Rules.  
Α. UNCITRAL Working Group Report III — Are solely procedural 
reforms adequate? 
The decentralized nature of ISDS provides a State with multiple 
avenues of reform discussions ranging from ICSID Workshops,146 
UNCTAD events,147 OECD conferences,148 and various other regional 
forums.149 Working Group III has emerged as the umbrella multilateral 
forum bringing several relevant stakeholders to the table. In line with 
the UNCITRAL process, Working Group III was entrusted with 
ensuring deliberations among the widest possible breadth of available 
expertise from relevant stakeholders.150 The mandate of the Working 
Group III encompasses identification and consideration of concerns 
regarding ISDS, whether reforms may be desirable and, if so, develop 
and recommend options to UNCITRAL.151 The Working Group III by 
 
145. See, e.g., UNCITRAL and Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement, 
IISD (July 2017), https://www.iisd.org/projects/uncitral-and-reform-
investment-dispute-settlement [https://perma.cc/E49V-PYDT]. 
146. See News & Events, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-
events/events [https://perma.cc/TN66-MML5]. 
147. Meetings and Events, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/meetings-
search?Operator=and&keys=oecd [https://perma.cc/N3YL-WGVN]. 
148. Meetings / Conferences / Agendas, OECD, 
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/publicationsdocuments/meetingsconfer
encesagendas/ [https://perma.cc/P39M-CJBL]. 
149. See also Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules (ICSID Working 
Paper, Paper No. 4, 2020) (discussing proposals for amending the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules). 
150. Draft Rep. of the Working Grp. III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/964 
(2018).  
151. Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Information 
on Options for Implementing a Workplan, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade 
L., Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) 
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its very mandate limits itself to procedural aspects of ISDS.152 It was 
clarified in explicit terms that the “mandate given to the working group 
focused on the procedural aspects of dispute settlement rather than on 
the substantive provisions.”153 At the same time, broad discretion was 
proffered on Working Group III with regard to solutions it would 
devise, after taking into account the view of all States.154 
Thus, by divorcing substantive aspects of ISDS reform from its 
mandate, the stage is set for the reform proposal to focus minimally on 
Second- and Third-Generation Rights. Working Group III was tasked 
with a laser-focused mandate of placing sole emphasis on improving 
certain First-Generation Rights.155 The reform agenda is currently 
examining several issues. First, the Working Group III briefly 
considered alternative modes of arbitral appointments156 and sought to 
develop a code of conduct to mitigate an apparent lack of independence 
for arbitrators.157 The appointment of arbitrators has been blithely 
 
Thirty-Seventh Session, Note by the Secretariat, Apr. 1–5, 2019, at 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.158 (Jan. 25, 2019). 
152. See, e.g., UNCITRAL and Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement, 
IISD (July 2017), https://www.iisd.org/projects/uncitral-and-reform-
investment-dispute-settlement [https://perma.cc/E49V-PYDT]. 
153. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-fourth 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, ¶ 20 (2017) [hereinafter Report of 
Working Group III - 34th Session]. 
154. See Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., ¶ 264, 
U.N. Doc. A/72/17 (2017) (emphasizing that each State has “the choice 
of whether and to what extent it wished to adopt the relevant 
solution(s)”). 
155. Duggal, supra note 142. 
156. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Selection and Appointment of ISDS Tribunal 
Members, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.169 
(2019) [hereinafter Possible Reform of ISDS - Selection and Appointment] 
(noting that “disputing parties normally enjoy broad powers in the 
selection of arbitrators” and “the rules applicable in investor-State 
arbitration allow disputing parties to agree on the method to select the 
arbitrators and to agree directly upon their identity”). 
157. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Background Information on a Code of 
Conduct, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.167 
(2019) (“At the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the [UNCITRAL] 
Working Group . . . it was suggested that measures enhancing confidence 
in the independence and impartiality of ISDS tribunal members would be 
in the interest of both States and investors”). 
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unregulated158 in the ISDS regime, resulting in private commercial law 
practitioners occupying Tribunal positions, which explains the second-
grade treatment provided to crucial human rights issues.159 Thus, the 
Working Group III seeks to further various ideas such as utilization of 
a pre-established roster of arbitrators (that takes into account gender 
balance, diversity and geographical distributions)160 and a more 
emphasized role of arbitral institutions in appointments.161 Thus, such 
foundational reforms towards regulating arbitrator appointments in the 
ISDS regime ensures a step towards “competent, independent and 
impartial”162 adjudicators in the true sense.  
Second, the Working Group III is considering issues relating to 
counterclaims, costs, and durations of ISDS proceedings.163 It has noted 
that obligations of investors in instances such as human rights, 
environment and corporate social responsibilities fall under the 
umbrella consideration of counterclaims.164 The Working Group even 
 
158. See Possible Reform of ISDS – Selection and Appointment, supra note 
156, at ¶10 (noting that the selection and appointment of arbitrators is 
“flexible” and “not strictly regulated”).  
159. See Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human 
Rights?, 60 INST. INT’L & COMP. LAW Q. 573, 576–77 (2011) (“This 
might be in the investment arbitrators’ genes, because what is probably 
the large majority of them has a private or commercial law rather than a 
public law or public international law background and might thus tend 
to see international human rights as a potential, or probable, cause of 
political disturbances, intruding in their ‘purely legal’, autonomous field, 
with its ground rules being determined by neo-liberal thought. In a way, 
this is not hard to understand, because, after all, protection of foreign 
investment is to benefit the investor, while human-rights-based claims, if 
and when they arise in investment disputes, will mainly appear as defenses 
argued by States that have interfered in such investments.”). 
160. See Possible Reform of ISDS – Selection and Appointment, supra note 
156, ¶ 26 (noting that “[o]verall, a roster should take into account the 
gender balance, geographical distribution, and balancing between 
arbitrators from developing and developed countries”). 
161. See id. ¶ 35 (“A system where institutions administering ISDS cases 
would play a greater role in the selection and appointment of members of 
ISDS tribunals is an option for reform that could be considered in 
conjunction with the creation of a roster.”) 
162. See ICCPR Art. 14(1), supra note 8, at 176. 
163. See Possible Reform of ISDS – Selection and Appointment, supra note 
156, ¶ 17. 
164. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Report of Working Group III (Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-seventh 
Session (New York, 1–5 April 2019), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/970, ¶ 34 (2019) 
[hereinafter Report of Working Group III - 37th Session] (noting the 
related issues of “obligations of investors (for example, in relation to 
human rights, the environment as well as to corporate social 
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goes on to allude to the notion of protecting sustainable development 
as a legal basis for furthering counterclaims.165 The Working Group III 
sought to potentially consider claims by third parties against 
investors.166 Thus, despite the mandate of the Working Group III being 
limited to procedural matters,167 counterclaims may prove to be a 
crucial substantive reform it has taken within its ambit to bolster 
Second-and Third-Generation Rights.  
At its 39th Session, the Working Group III further attempted to 
forward key reforms to tackle concurrent proceedings, frivolous claims, 
security for costs and abuse of process.168 By seeking to chop off 
inefficiencies to chart a more robust justice delivery mechanism, we see 
a clear advancement of certain First-Generation Rights of ensuring a 
procedural economy in a dispute resolution system.169 Moreover, the 
Working Group III has prioritized coherence and consistence in 
interpretation by considering treaty parties’ involvement and control 
mechanisms on treaty interpretation.170 It has considered mechanisms 
such as release of travaux préparatoires and greater usage171 of 
 
responsibility)” and “the question of allowing counterclaims by States as 
well as claims by third parties against investors”). 
165. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Multiple Proceedings and Counterclaims, Note 
by the Secretariat, 2020 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.193, ¶¶ 40–41 
(2020) [hereinafter Possible Reform of ISDS - Multiple Proceedings and 
Counterclaims] (“[T]he Working Group may wish to consider formulating 
provisions on investor obligations which would form the basis for a State’s 
counterclaims . . . The Working Group may wish to further consider how 
to impose such obligations in investment treaties as well as in relevant 
contracts or domestic laws governing foreign investment.”). 
166. Report of Working Group III - 37th Session, supra note 164, ¶ 34. 
167. Report of Working Group III - 34th Session, supra note 153, ¶ 20. 
168. Possible Reform of ISDS – Multiple Proceedings and Counterclaims, supra 
note 165, ¶ 30. 
169. See) CCJE Opinions and Magna Carta, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Nov. 24, 
2004), https://rm.coe.int/168074752d [https://perma.cc/Q5FM-SZXR] 
(choose “Opinion n°6 (2006)) (“The CCJE considers that the judicial 
system should not obstruct access to justice through excessive costs . . . . 
Under Principle 2, judges should have power to control abuse of 
procedure, by sanctions on a party or lawyers.”). 
170. See Draft Rep. of the Working Grp. III, supra note 150.  
171. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Interpretation of Investment treaties by 
Treaty Parties, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.191, ¶ 38 (2020) [hereinafter Possible Reform of 
ISDS - Interpretation of Investment Treaties by Treaty Parties] (“It 
should be noted that, according to UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub, 
126 of the 2,573, treaties analysed (4.9 per cent) are marked as expressly 
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institutionalized cooperation between treaty parties to establish 
standing bodies,172 thereby facilitating common interpretations.173 
There exists continued apprehensions from all corners174 that a 
solely procedural mandate would drastically diminish the opportunity 
to address core substantive issues.175 This apprehension is magnified by 
the fact that substantive issues often form the basis of growing 
discontentment amongst developing countries stemming from 
“expropriation, most-favoured-nation treatment, non-discrimination, 
and fair and equitable treatment, all of which have been given unduly 
 
allowing for binding interpretations by the contracting parties or by 
interpretative committees or commissions. Only thirty-one treaties, or 
slightly over 1.56 per cent contain institutional arrangements in the form 
of interpretative committees or commissions.”). 
172. See, e.g., Canada Honduras Free Trade Agreement, Can.- Hond. art. 
21.1.3, Oct. 1, 2014 (“The Commission may: (a) adopt interpretive 
decisions concerning this Agreement, which shall be binding on the 
dispute settlement panels established under Article 21.10 and on 
Tribunals established under Section C of Chapter Ten (Investment – 
Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of the Other 
Party)”); Agreement between The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union 
and Montenegro on The Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, Belg.-Montenegro art.13, Feb. 16, 2010 (“the dispute shall 
be submitted to a joint commission consisting of representative of the two 
parties”). 
173. See Possible Reform of ISDS - Interpretation of Investment Treaties by 
Treaty Parties, supra note 171, ¶¶ 40–42 (“[I]nterpretations can be issued 
on the initiative of the committees or commissions, at the request of either 
of the contracting parties, at the request of the tribunal if a respondent 
or a disputing party asks for an interpretation, or as the result of various 
combinations of grounds.”). 
174. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Submission from the Government of South 
Africa, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176, ¶ 
20 (2019) (“South Africa is of the view that we cannot divorce the 
procedural from substantive concerns as they are intricately related. 
Given that the UNICTRAL process is government-led and the 
Commission when giving the mandate agreed that broad discretion should 
be left to the Working Group in discharging its mandate, the Working 
Group would not be fully discharging its mandate if discussions on the 
substantive concerns were excluded.”); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., 
Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Submission 
from the Government of Bahrain, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.180, ¶ 65 (2019) (“Bahrain shares the views 
expressed by the governments of Thailand and Indonesia in their remarks 
to Working Group III that restricting consideration of ISDS reform to 
procedural aspects alone – without considering reform of substantive 
treaty protections – is a missed opportunity.”). 
175. See Submission from the Government of South Africa, supra note 174; 
Submission from the Government of Bahrain, supra note 175.  
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pro-investor interpretations at the expense of states.”176 The Working 
Groups Reports have intermittently displayed accommodative 
flexibility in bringing compelling substantive issues under the wing of 
identified procedural concerns.177 However, by improving some of these 
First-Generation Rights, there might be trickle down reforms in 
substantive Second- and Third-Generation Rights, for example, the 
appointment of arbitrators.  
B. Can the Multilateral Investment Court Provide Solutions for the 
Future of Human Rights in ISDS?  
The Multilateral Investment Court proposal seeks to recognize that 
the current ISDS framework is administered, by ICSID or other centers, 
where tribunals are set up on a case-by-case basis, and are thus heavily 
fragmented. Thus, a radical overhaul of a fragmented ISDS framework 
is spearheaded by the European Union, by seeking to establish a 
permanent investment court, with sovereign appointed adjudicators 
akin to other international judicial bodies such as the ICJ, ICC, and 
ITLOS.178 A first step towards establishing a court system was seen in 
agreements between the EU and Canada (CETA),179 as well as 
negotiations with multiple other States.180 While emerging as a 
European reform proposal, today, it forms a part of UNCITRAL 
Working Group III’s181 discussion mandate—emanating out of the 
 
176. Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOODE 
HALL L. SCH. (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-
statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/ 
[https://perma.cc/U5YS-F5Y8]. 
177. See generally U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Appellate and Multilateral 
Court Mechanisms, Note by Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP/185 (July 17, 2019) [hereinafter Possible Reform of 
ISDS – Appellate and Multilateral Court Mechanisms]; U.N. Comm’n on 
Int’l Trade L., Submission from the European Union and Its Member 
States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1 (Jan. 24, 2019) 
[hereinafter Submission from the European Union and Its Member States]. 
178. See generally Submission from the European Union and Its Member 
States, supra note 177. 
179. See generally Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-European Union Ch. 8 Sec. F, Oct. 30, 
2016. 
180. See Legislative Train 10.2020 3 International Trade – INTA: TTIP 




181. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l L., Rep. of Working Grp III (Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Resumed Thirty-Eighth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/1004/Add.1 (Jan. 28, 2020). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Adding New Ingredients to an Old Recipe: Do ISDS Reforms and New 
Investment Treaties Support Human Rights? 
146 
 
European Union’s proposal for a standing Multilateral Investment 
Court.182 
EU’s proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court envisioned a 
two-tier system of adjudication.183 Decisions of the tribunal of first 
instances would be appealable before a multilateral appellate body 
staffed by tenured judicial figures.184 Appeal procedures would be open 
only for errors of law (including serious procedural shortcoming) or 
manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts.185 The appeal 
mechanism would further be ring-fenced from abusive practices by 
mechanisms such as provision of security.186 The proposal for a standing 
multilateral court may be indicative of trust in practical experiences of 
 
182. See generally Submission from the European Union and Its Member 
States, supra note 177. 
183. See generally Possible Reform of ISDS – Appellate and Multilateral Court 
Mechanisms, supra note 177, ¶ 47 (“A multilateral appellate body could 
also be established as a second tier in a multilateral investment court, 
staffed by tenured, professional judges and supported by a permanent 
secretariat.”). 
184. See Possible Reform of ISDS – Appellate and Multilateral Court 
Mechanisms, supra note 177, ¶ 47 (“A multilateral appellate body could 
also be established as a second tier in a multilateral investment court, 
staffed by tenured, professional judges and supported by a permanent 
secretariat.”); Submission from the European Union and Its Member 
States, supra note 177, ¶ 53 (“Instead, adjudicators would be considered 
independent and impartial on account of their tenure and it would only 
be in very specific limited cases that a potential conflict of interest might 
arise and would need to be dealt with.”). 
185. See Submission from the European Union and Its Member States, supra 
note 177 (“[A]ppellate tribunal would hear appeals from the tribunal of 
first instance. Grounds of appeal should be error of law (including serious 
procedural shortcomings) or manifest errors in the appreciation of the 
facts. It should not undertake a de novo review of the facts”); Possible 
Reform of ISDS – Appellate and Multilateral Court Mechanisms, supra 
note 177, ¶ 19 (“A question for consideration is whether an appellate 
mechanism should provide for a review of issues de novo or whether it 
should accord some degree of deference to the findings of the first 
adjudicator. Formulations limiting the appeal to “clear”, “serious” or 
“manifest” errors of law/assessment of the facts, depending on the 
grounds for appeal, would thus limit the scope of review, and define the 
“balance of power” between the first and second tier. In a Submission, it 
is suggested that an appellate mechanism should be tasked to review, in 
addition to errors of law, manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts, 
but that it should not undertake a de novo review of the facts (see below, 
para. 53)”). 
186. See Submission from the European Union and Its Member States, supra 
note 177. 
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the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism.187 Quite akin to the WTO, 
the EU proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court suggests full-time 
adjudicators would not conduct external activities, subject to strict 
ethical requirements similar to other international courts.188 Like 
UNCITRAL Working Group III, the proposal in its birthing stages 
emphasizes certain limited First-Generation Rights with minimal 
references to Second-and Third-Generation Rights. The only linkage to 
Second- and Third-Generation Rights is seen from a linkage to other 
reforms expounded above; specifically, the possibility of 
counterclaims.189 
Finally, third-party participation as a lighthouse for transparency 
in proceedings has been highlighted and, taking the example of 
communities affected by the dispute participating in proceedings,190 the 
Working Group has alluded to the possibility of Second-Generation 
Rights coming into play.191 Yet, there exists limited substantive 
guidance on this issue within the proposal for a Multilateral Investment 
Court.  
 
187. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Submission from the Government of 
China, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.177, at 4 
(July 19, 2019) (“The practical experience of the World Trade 
Organization dispute settlement mechanism reflects the relatively high 
efficiency of its appeal mechanism as well as its moderate operating 
costs.”). 
188. See generally Multilateral Investment Court: Overview of the Reform 
Proposals and Prospects, EUR. PARLIAMENT THINK TANK (Jan. 1, 2020), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference
=EPRS_BRI(2020)646147 [https://perma.cc/7XZ3-7G99].  
189. See Submission from the European Union and Its Member States, supra 
note 177, ¶ 70 (“A standing mechanism might also include (i) mechanisms 
for ensuring early dismissal of unfounded claims; (ii) a possibility for 
encouraging parties to solve their dispute through mediation; (iii) a 
mechanism to cater for possible counter-claims by respondents”). 
190. See Submission from the European Union and Its Member States, supra 
note 177, ¶¶ 28–29 (“A high level of transparency of the proceedings 
should be ensured. . . . It should also be provided that third parties, for 
example representatives of communities affected by the dispute, be 
permitted to participate in investment disputes.”) 
191. See Nicholas J. Diamond & Kabir A.N. Duggal, ISDS Reform and 
Advancing All “Generations of Human Rights, WOLTERS KLUWER 
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VI. Evaluating Recent State Practice and How It 
May Impact Human Rights 
As noted above, a common criticism faced by international 
investment law is the allegation that substantive obligations, as 
envisioned under international investment agreements, competes with 
a State’s power to regulate.192 As a result, States have proceeded to 
include treaty safeguards and provisions of various forms (which shall 
be discussed in greater detail) to actively assert the prominence of the 
State’s regulatory right and human rights in the ISDS framework.193  
It is noteworthy to make a preliminary observation at this stage 
that the inclusion of provisions affirming State’s right to regulate may 
be viewed in two ways. First, the new treaties may suggest that core 
investment obligations have always provided for a certain margin for 
the State regulatory powers. The inclusion of provisions affirming 
State’s right to regulate is a mere re-statement of the existing view of 
States.194 Second, the new treaties suggest an active paradigm shift 
towards State’s asserting a shift in how the Tribunal must interpret 
investment obligations in a manner that does not second-guess the 
regulatory choices of the State organs. Such a view would radically 
change the core of existing investment obligations.195  
The conundrum mentioned above may take different shapes and 
forms depending on the particular wordings of the treaty. This paper 
attempts to map investment agreements entered into since 2018. Of a 
total of 66 investment agreements, the English versions, a total of 38 
agreements, are publicly available from a wide array of States in both 
developing and developed countries. This provides a meaningful insight 
into what States are doing in light of the backlash against ISDS. The 
subsequent section delves into the different shapes and forms in which 
States have attempted to incorporate Second- and Third-Generation 
Human Rights into investment agreements. 
 
192. See D. SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 43 
(2008) (“While seemingly providing some stability to investment 
interests, it destabilizes the capacity for self-government represented by 
constitutional rules that enable democratic processes to do their work”). 
193. See generally Investment Protection Agreement, art. 2.2, European 
Union-Viet., June 30, 2019. 
194. See generally Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
art. 8.9, ¶1, European Union-Can., Oct. 30, 2016. 
195. Id. ¶ 2–4. 
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Α. Treaty Practice 2018-2020 
1. References in a Treaty’s Preamble 
In unsurprising contrast to the BITs concluded in 2000,196 a little 
over 95 percent of investment agreements signed since 2018 include 
references to health and safety, environment or sustainable 
development in the treaty.197 Only two IIAs within the scope of the 
analysis provide no specific reference to health, environment, or the 
State’s regulatory space.198 IIAs surveyed for the purposes of this paper 
concluded between 2018 and 2020 may be bestowed the moniker “New 
Age Investment Agreements” as they have adopted various tools to 
avoid legitimate regulation by a State to safeguard the rights of its 
citizens is put to test before an investment tribunal. Select key tools 
include the references in an IIA’s preamble, provisions preserving policy 
space for regulating in the public interest, exclusion of welfare measures 
from expropriation, and general exception provisions.199  
Preambles are generally the first harbor for the tribunal’s search 
for the purpose and objective of a treaty and form an important 
interpretative tool.200 Although preambular recitals are not an operative 
legal part of the treaty,201 they may suggest the object and purpose of 
 
196. International Investment Agreements Issues Note: Recent Developments 
in the International Investment Regime, UNCTAD (May 2018) 
[hereinafter UNCTAD], https://unctad.org/system/files/official-
document/diaepcbinf2018d1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNT5-TDFL]. 
197. See generally id. 
198. See generally Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Kaz.-U.A.E., Mar. 
24, 2018 [hereinafter Kazakhstan-UAE BIT, 2018]; Agreement between 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People’s Republic 
of China and the Government of the United Arab Emirates: For The 
Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, H.K.-U.A.E., June 
16, 2019 [hereinafter Hong Kong-China-UAE BIT, 2019]. 
199. See UNCTAD, supra note 196. 
200. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31(1)–(2), May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in light of its object and purpose . . . . The context for the 
purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes.”); see also Enron Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 259 (May 22, 
2007) (“The Tribunal gives weight to the text of the Treaty’s Preamble . 
. . .”). 
201. Jan Klabbers, Treaties and Their Preambles, in CONCEPTUAL AND 
CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 
172,172 (Michael J. Bowman & Dino Kritsiotis ed., 2018) 
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a treaty, and are also part of the treaty’s context.202 The range of 
treaties surveyed under this paper shows that 28% of treaties do not 
expressly mention protection of public health, environment and 
regulatory autonomy in their preambles.203 This is seen even in treaties 
that are heavily protective of Second-Generation Rights of public health 
and environmental protection, in the form of various other treaty 
mechanisms.204  
When it comes to preambles themselves, States have adopted 
different approaches. Reserving rights in the preamble, for example, 
some treaties provide that: “resolving to preserve their flexibility to set 
legislative and regulatory priorities, safeguard public welfare, and 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety, the environment, the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources, the integrity and stability of the financial 
system and public morals.”205 Some anchor obligations with 
international standards in the preamble’s language, with investments 
being made in consonance with Second-Generation Rights, for example: 
“seeking to ensure that investment is consistent with the protection of 
health, safety and the environment, the promotion and protection of 
internationally and domestically recognised human rights, labour rights, 
and internationally recognised standards of corporate social 
responsibility.”206 This stands in contrast with forward-looking 
 
202. See id. at 184–88. 
203. This is based on authors’ analysis of IIAs signed from 2018 through 2020 
listed and publicly available as of August 2020 via UNCTAD’S 
International Investment Agreement Navigator. See generally 
International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements [https://perma.cc/C5A4-4TJP]. 
204. See generally Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty between 
the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of India, Braz.-India, 
Jan. 25, 2020 [hereinafter Brazil-India BIT, 2020]; Treaty between the 
Republic of Belarus and the Republic of India on Investments, Belr.-India, 
Sept. 24, 2018 [hereinafter Belarus-India BIT, 2018].  
205. See Agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and Japan for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Morocco-Japan, Jan. 8, 2020 
[hereinafter Japan-Morocco BIT, 2020]; Agreement between Australia and 
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, Apr. 5, 2019 [hereinafter Australia-Uruguay BIT, 2019]. 
206. See Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and 
the Government of Hungary, Belr. -Hung., Jan. 14, 2019; Agreement 
Between the Government of Hungary and the Government of the 
Republic of Cape Verde for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Hung.-Cape Verde, Mar. 28, 2019 [hereinafter Cabo Verde-
Hungary BIT, 2019]. 
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preambles that seek to preserve the State’s regulatory flexibility.207 
Some reference a general right to preserve autonomy, for example: 
“Reaffirming their regulatory autonomy and policy space.”208 The 
essence of the matter being, preambles affirming State’s emphasis on 
protection of Second-Generation Rights were once known as “non-
traditional preambles,”209 have now come to be a mainstay in 
investment agreements (albeit in differing formats).  
 
 
207. Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT, 2019, supra note 206 (“Seeking to ensure that 
investment is consistent with the protection of health, safety and the 
environment, the promotion and protection of internationally and 
domestically recognised human rights, labour rights, and internationally 
recognised standards of corporate social responsibility”); Agreement 
Between the Republic of Belarus and the Government of Hungary for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Belr.-Hung., Jan. 
14, 2019 (“Seeking to ensure that investment is consistent with the 
protection of health, safety and the environment, the promotion and 
protection of internationally and domestically recognised human rights, 
labour rights, and internationally recognised standards of corporate social 
responsibility.”) 
208. See Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement between the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Co-Operative Republic of Guyana 
Preamble, Braz.-Guy., Dec. 13, 2018 [hereinafter Brazil-Guyana BIT, 
2018] (“Reaffirming their regulatory autonomy and policy space”); 
Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement between the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Suriname Preamble, 
May, 2, 2018 [hereinafter Brazil-Suriname BIT, 2018] (“Reassuring their 
regulatory autonomy and each Party’s policy space”) 
209. See UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS 
IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, at 5, U.N. Sales No. E.06.IID.16 (2007) 
(Table 2. Examples of non-traditional preambles. BIT between the 
Republic of Korea and Trinidad & Tobago (2002) “The Government of 
the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Contracting Parties’), Desiring 
to intensify economic cooperation between both States, Intending to 
create favourable conditions for investments by investors of one 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, based 
on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, Recognizing that the 
promotion and protection of investments on the basis of this Agreement 
will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative and 
will increase prosperity in both States, Respecting the sovereignty and 
laws of the Contracting Party within whose jurisdiction the investments 
fall, and Convinced that these objectives can be achieved without relaxing 
health, safety and environmental measures of general application, Have 
agreed as follows: . . .”) 
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2.  Provisions Preserving Policy Space for Regulating in the Public 
Interest 
Another tool for attempting to safeguard Second-Generation Rights 
of health and environment, as well as a State’s broader regulatory space 
is seen in the form of a specific treaty provision.211 Countries have 
attempted to protect public welfare measures more broadly by adding 
general language supporting a “right to regulate.”212 For example, the 
EU–Vietnam IPA provides that “[t]he Parties reaffirm their right to 
regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, 
such as the protection of public health, safety, environment or public 
 
210. This is based on authors’ analysis of IIAs signed from 2018 through 2020 
listed and publicly available as of August 2020 via UNCTAD’S 
International Investment Agreement Navigator. See International 
Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 203. 
211. See Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Policy Space in 
Investment Agreement, INST. OF INT’L ECON. L. ISSUE BRIEF 4 (2017) 
(“In recent years, governments have paid greater attention to this issue 
and negotiated a series of provisions aimed at further safeguarding public 
interest. These include express provisions on the host state’s right to 
regulate, interpretive statements, provisions designed to narrow the scope 
of expropriation and FET, preambular language underscoring the 
importance of public policy concerns, and as mentioned above and the 
focus of this Issue Brief, general exceptions clauses”). 
212. See EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
art. 8.9, ¶1, European Union-Can., Oct. 30, 2016. 
72%
28%
PREAMBLE OF INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS 2018 TO 2020 
Mention of public health, environment or
regulatory autonomy
No mention of public heath, environment or
regulatory autonomy
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morals, social or consumer protection, or promotion and protection of 
cultural diversity.”213 Treaty practices indicate that such provisions 
seeking to preserve the State’s policy space for regulating in the public 
interest are primarily worded in three forms.  
First, a slew of investment agreements include a provision stating 
that nothing within the agreement would prevent the State from 
regulating investment activity to further protect of Second-Generation 
Rights such as public health, environment and labor rights.214 At the 
same time, they do not explicitly affirm an obligation of non-dilution 
of Second-Generation Rights by the States in order to attract 
investments. For example, the Peru–Australia FTA provides that 
“[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a party from 
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent 
with this chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive 
to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.”215 
Second, another set of investment-agreements merely affirms an 
obligation on States to not dilute existing Second-Generation Rights 
frameworks (such as environmental, labor and health laws) in order to 
attract investments. Such agreements do not include the second limb 
that makes an affirmation that nothing within the agreement would 
preclude the State’s right to regulate.216 This trend is primarily seen in 
investment agreements signed by Japan after 2018.217 
 
213. Investment Protection Agreement art. 2.2, European Union-Viet., June 
30, 2019. 
214. See, e.g., id.; Cabo-Hungary BIT, 2019, supra note 206, at art.3; Hong 
Kong-China-UAE BIT, 2019, supra note 198, at art. 15; Agreement 
between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and the Government 
of Hungary for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
art. 3, Belr.- Hung., Jan. 14, 2019. 
215. Peru-Australia Free Trade Agreement art. 8.16, Peru-Austl., Feb. 12, 
2018. 
216. See generally Cabo-Hungary BIT, 2019, supra note 206, at art. 3. 
217. See, e.g., Agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and Japan for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Morocco-Japan art.19, Aug. 1, 
2020 [hereinafter Japan-Morocco BIT] (“Each Contracting Party shall 
refrain from encouraging investments by investors of the other 
Contracting Party by relaxing its health, safety or environmental 
measures, or by lowering its labour standards. To this effect, each 
Contracting Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such 
measures or standards as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition or expansion in its Territory of investments by Investors of 
the other Contracting Party”). 
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Third, some provisions provide for a two-pronged approach:218 the 
provision states that nothing within the agreement would prevent the 
State from regulating investment activity for the further protection of 
Second-Generation Rights such as public health, environment and labor 
rights; the provision affirms that the State may not dilute existing 
Second-Generation Rights framework of the State in order to attract 
investment. This trend is primarily seen in investment agreements 
signed by Brazil after 2018.219  
Fourth, another example found in investment agreements is when 
a State has sought to exclude a dispute resolution framework from the 
scope of its provisions.220 As an example, the Brazil–Suriname BIT 
provides that certain articles may not be subject to arbitration, 
including Article 6(1) on combatting corruption, Article 15 on CSR, 















218. See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between the 
EFTA States and The Republic of Ecuador, Art. 4.6, June 25, 2018; 
Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
Between the Argentine Republic and the United Arab Emerites, Arg.-
U.A.E., art. 12, Apr. 16, 2018 [hereinafter Argentine-UAE BIT]. 
219. See, e.g., Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty between the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of India, art. 6, Jan. 25, 
2020; Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement Between the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Arab Emitates, Braz.-
U.A.E., art. 17, Mar. 15, 2019; Brazil-Guyana BIT, 2018, supra note 208, 
at art. 17; Brazil-Suriname BIT, 2018, supra note 208, at art.17; 
Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on Investment Cooperation and 
Facilitation, art. 16, Apr. 11, 2018. 
220. See, e.g., Brazil-Guyana BIT, 2018, supra note 208, art. 25.3; Brazil-
Suriname BIT, supra note 209, 2018, art. 25.3, Argentine-UAE BIT, supra 
note 218, art. 21.1 (b). 
221. Brazil-Suriname BIT, 2018, supra note 208, at art. 25.3. 
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3. Exclusion of Welfare Measures from Indirect Expropriation 
Twenty-eight of the thirty-eight treaties surveyed for the purposes 
of this paper include a clarificatory note to the provision on 
expropriation.223 Treaties have more broad and uniform language, such 
as: “[n]on-discriminatory legal measures designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.”224 
 
222. International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements [perma.cc/3Z7X-LJLV] (Based on authors’ analysis of 
publicly available IIAs signed from 2018 through 2020). 
223. See, e.g., Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty between the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of India, art. 6, Jan. 25, 
2020. 
224. Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Turkey and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on The Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Cambodia, art. 5.2, Oct. 21, 2018; 
Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and Japan for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Japan, art. 6, Dec. 1, 2018; Agreement 








INVESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
OTHER REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 2018:2020
Absent
Only non dilution of standards to attract investment
On affirmation of right to regulate
Contains both prongs
Contains both prongs and is placed outside the purview of dispute resolution
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This clear and unequivocal clarification by States with regard to 
primacy of regulation safeguarding Second- and Third-Generation 
Rights has emerged in the backdrop of a barrage of investment claims 
against environmental and public health regulation,225 among other 
policies, with recent cases relating to industries such as mining, 
pharmaceuticals,226 and tobacco227 causing controversy and concern. 
Such claims demonstrate increasing legal sophistication by claimants in 
exploiting open-textured provisions and tribunals adopting the sole 
effects doctrine228 to adjudicate indirect expropriation claims. 
Clarificatory notes with regard to indirect expropriation may seek to 
effectively stem such claims and lift off the shroud of regulatory chill 
from the States in order to safeguard Second-Generation Rights of the 
citizens. 
4. General Exception Provisions 
Close to sixty-eight percent of investment agreements executed 
since 2018 contain a General Exceptions provision.229 The General 
Exceptions provision finds its origin in Art. XX of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),230 and is structured in three 
distinct elements (a similar structuring is seen both in investment 
agreements as well as Art. XX of the GATT): (1) an exhaustive list of 
permissible policy objectives (pursuant to which States may enact 
measures in contravention of general treaty obligations);231 (2) a nexus 
 
Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Mutual 
Protection of Investments, Kaz.-Sing., art. 6.6, Nov. 21, 2018; Agreement 
Between the Governemnt of the Republic of Korea and the Government 
of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, S. Kor.-Arm., annex 1.3(b), Oct. 19, 2018. 
225. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. U.S., UNCITRAL Case, Final Award on 
Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005). 
226. See Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S., Biofarma, S.A.S., Arts et Techniques 
du Progres S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, Final Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2012). 
227. See Philip Morris Brands v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/07, Award, (July 8, 2016). 
228. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 116 (May 
29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. (“The government’s intention is less important 
than the effects of the measures on the owner of the assets or on the 
benefits arising from such assets affected by the measures; and the form 
of the deprivation measure is less important than its actual effects.”). 
229. See supra text accompanying note 211.  
230. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
pt.5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
231. Id. at (a)–(f). 
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requirement (which highlights the relation between the measure 
undertaken and the policy goal sought);232 and (3) the chapeau 
requirement (the measure should not be arbitrary or cause unjustifiable 
discrimination where like conditions prevail or disguised restrictions on 
trade and investments exist).233 Investment agreements signed since 
2018 show a rapid upsurge in the incorporation of the General 
Exceptions provision.234 General Exceptions provisions seek to provide 
a last line of defense for States in cases where measures taken to protect 
public health, environment, etc. are challenged.235  
There are two forms under investment treaties that the provisions 
are structured around.236 Forty-seven percent of treaties see a mutatis 
mutandis incorporation of all three elements of Article XX of the 
GATT.237 Twenty-one percent incorporate a General Exceptions 
provision with certain limited modifications.238 Several trends persist. 
First, the General Exceptions provision may be invoked only in cases 
where the claim pertains to National Treatment or the MFN 
provisions.239 Second, the General Exceptions provision may be invoked 
 
232. Id. at (g)–(k). 
233. GATT, supra note 230.  
234. International Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 222. 
235. See JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14–18, (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2012). 
236. Levent Sabanogullari, The Merits and Limitations of General Exception 
Clauses in Contemporary Investment Treaty Practice, INVESTMENT 
TREATY NEWS (May 21, 2015), 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2015/05/21/the-merits-and-limitations-of-
general-exception-clauses-in-contemporary-investment-treaty-practice/ 
[perma.cc/K88M-ZHAD] (“There are two different models of general 
exceptions in IIAs—one that follows theapproach of Article XX of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and another that is 
modelled on Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).”). 
237. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and Japan for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Japan, art. 15, Dec. 1, 
2018; Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between the 
EFTA States and The Republic of Ecuador, Art. 6.3, June 25, 2018; 
Agreement Between Japan and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and 
Protection of investment, art. 15, Japan-Jordan, Nov. 27, 2018; Economic 
Partnership Agreement, CARIFORUM States-U.K., art. 224, 2019; 
Treaty Between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of India on 
Investments, Belr.-India, art. 32, Sept. 24, 2018. 
238. See International Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 222. 
239. See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, E.U.-Viet., June 12, 2020, Art. 8.53. (“Subject to 
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
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solely where the claim pertains to the National Treatment provision.240 
Third, the General Exceptions provision may partially incorporate of 
the chapeau from Art. XX of the GATT.241 The General Exceptions 
provision contains a protective mechanism to prevent abuse by States. 
This is in the form of ensuring that the measures are not arbitrary or 
unjustified discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
investment.242 The India-Kyrgyz BIT and the 2019 and the 2018 
Cambodia-Turkey BIT243 incorporate only a single limb of this chapeau 
by requiring the measure to only be non-discriminatory.244 Fourth, the 
General Exceptions provision may completely omit the chapeau.245 The 
2018 Argentina–UAE BIT peculiarly omits both requirements of the 
 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on establish mentor operation of an enterprise or cross-border supply of 
services, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as preventing the 
adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures”). 
240. See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the 
Republic of Singapore, art. 8.62, Oct. 19, 2018 (“Subject to the 
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against the 
other Party where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
establishment or cross-border supply of services, nothing in this Chapter 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by a Party of 
measures . . . necessary to protect public security or public morals or to 
maintain public order.”). 
241. See Levent Sabanogullari, supra note 236. 
242. Id.  
243. See Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Turkey and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on The Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Cambodia, art. 4.1, Oct. 
21, 2018 (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any non-
discriminatory legal measures”). 
244. See Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic and the Government of the Republic of India, Kyrg-India, art. 
32.1, June 14, 2019 (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by a Party of measures of general 
applicability applied on a non discriminatory basis that are necessary to: 
(i) protect public morals or maintaining public order; (ii) protect human, 
animal or plant life or health”). 
245. See Argentine-UAE BIT, art. 18 (“Nothing in this Agreement shall 
prevent the implementation by either Party of measures it deems 
necessary in order to: (a) maintain public order; (b) protect its own 
national interests, including its essential security interests; (c) fulfil its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security; (d) protect human, animal and plant life or health”). 
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measure being non-discriminatory as well as not being a disguised 










Provision Example forms of treaty practice 
References in an 
IIA’s preamble 
• Preserve a “general” right to a 
state’s regulatory space 
• Preserve certain specifically 
identified rights that are protected 
within the ambit of a State’s 
regulatory powers (e.g., health, 
environment) 
 
246. Id.  




GENERAL EXCEPTION PROVISION 2018:2020
General Exception Provision modelled on Article XX GATT
Modified version of Article XX GATT
Absent
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Provision Example forms of treaty practice 
• Require investments to be made in 




preserving a State’s 
regulatory/policy 
space 
• Protect a State’s right to adopt 
measures in the public interest 
• Affirm an obligation not to dilute 
public interest matters 
• Exclude public interest matters 
from the scope of the dispute 
resolution clause 





measures from the 
scope of indirect 
expropriation 
clause 
• Provisions that clarify that 
nondiscriminatory measures to 
further legitimate public welfare 
objectives are not considered an 
indirect expropriation, although 
such measures may be challenged 
as discriminatory or illegitimate 
General Exception 
provisions 
• Provisions incorporating 
exceptions modeled on GATT, 
Art. XX, either in whole or in part  
 
VII. Looking Ahead 
While several entrenched barriers have hindered the role of human 
rights within the ISDS system, notable movement to better recognize 
human rights within ISDS reform efforts and new IIAs have emerged. 
Such developments are no doubt positive, but we caution that progress 
may be slower than stakeholders might appreciate. Moreover, the scope 
of this progress may be restricted to First-Generation Rights (as in 
ISDS reform proposals), and only very select Second- and Third-
Generation Rights (as in new IIAs). Equally, we caution that this 
bifurcated approach, whereby ISDS reform efforts and new IIAs have 
been largely pursued separate and distinct from each other, may result 
in further inconsistencies and a general lack of alignment, suggesting 
the persistence of the above-mentioned entrenched barriers. Finally, it 
bears mention that the ultimate arbiter, as it were, of the future 
intersection of ISDS and human rights remains how reforms and new 
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IIAs impact arbitral practice. If meaningful change is to emerge, it must 
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